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Abstract. We examine empirically the effect of tax amnesties on long term tax collection 
when such amnesties are used by a government as a regular source of revenue. We use data 
from the Tucuman province (Argentina) to test the main hypothesis of the model, namely, 
that amnesties lower the government’s revenue, as they reduce the penalties and make 
evasion more profitable. We find, however, that amnesties do not affect the long-term 
revenue. The other main result is in line with the theoretical predictions: the increase in 
short-run revenue is temporary and only accelerates the collection of the taxes but does not 
increase the amount collected. Thus, we conclude that amnesties were used only to obtain a 
short-run surge in revenue and to avoid more fundamental tax reforms.  
Keywords. Tax amnesties, Tax evasion. 
JEL. H27, H26, C32. 
 
1. Introduction 
n the 1980’s, nearly 30 states in the United States, as well as many countries, 
offered a tax amnesty. Despite the widespread use of this tool, its efficacy as a 
fiscal instrument remains unclear, and a significant amount of theoretical, 
empirical and experimental research work has been undertaken in an attempt to 
reach a final verdict on the issue. Most of the studies focused on one-time 
amnesties, even when it is known than in many cases they were used repeatedly by 
the authorities1. 
This essay intends to examine the effect of tax amnesties on long term tax 
collection where such amnesties are used by a government as a regular source of 
revenue.  
The building block to achieve that goal consists of the empirical analysis of the 
effects of amnesties in the Argentinian State of Tucuman during the period 1978-
1999. 
The essay is organized as follows: we define and characterize tax amnesties in 
section 2 and consider how to evaluate their impact in section 3. In section 4 we 
review the related literature and in section 5 we develop a theoretical model for tax 
amnesties. In section 6 we test the theoretical predictions using data from 
Tucuman, a province in Argentina and, finally, we provide our conclusions in 
section 7. 
 
2. Tax Amnesties: Characterization 
A strand of the theory on tax evasion (Cowell & Gordon, 1988, etc.) suggests 
that it exists because individuals are not prone to voluntarily finance the optimal 
level of public goods. The greater the divergence between the perceived individual 
benefit from public expenditure and the private cost, the greater is the incentive to 
evade taxes. 
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Another strand (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972, etc.) considers evasion a gamble 
where people “win” if evasion is not discovered and “lose” if it is. Accordingly, a 
government could, supposedly, eliminate it by choosing a level of enforcement 
such that people find the gamble unattractive. 
However, government may be unable to apply the optimal level of enforcement 
in practice: increasing the audit probability (one of the variables it can use to 
manipulate enforcement) is costly, and maybe its evasion-eliminating value cannot 
be attained given the budget constraints. Similarly, penalties for evasion, the other 
instrument that can be used, are generally limited by institutional/feasibility 
constraints and, despite of being almost costless, the optimal level can be 
unattainable2. In such situations, evading taxes is part of a person’s optimal strategy 
and government must admit that a degree of tax evasion is inevitable: because of its 
cost, eradicating evasion completely is just not worth it. 
Under these circumstances, the discovery of a cheaper way to fight the problem 
became one of the most important objectives of tax agencies, and tax amnesties 
came onto the scene. 
A tax amnesty is a temporary opportunity that the government offers to people 
and/or firms that failed to pay their due taxes in earlier periods. The opportunity 
consists of a partial/total reduction in a person’s liabilities generated by previous 
evasion (unpaid taxes, interest and/or penalties) if that person voluntarily discloses 
it. In some cases, the government can also commit not to investigate/prosecute 
them. 
Amnesties promised an easy and quick growth in revenue and, even more 
importantly, would place additional individuals on the tax rolls, in so doing 
decreasing current evasion as well as –allegedly– improving future compliance. 
Amnesties appeared to be a “free lunch”, and policymakers were easily convinced 
of their multiple advantages: they would avoid both cuts in public expenditure and 
higher taxes, and the extra revenue would not come from honest taxpayers but from 
freeloaders who have been failing to pay their due taxes. 
However, some voices rose against amnesties, arguing that their success was 
not in fact theirs. According to them, the real factor that pushed revenue upwards 
was that enforcement was tighter once the amnesty finished. Moreover, if this 
tightening of enforcement activities was not carried out, the end result would be a 
decline in revenue. 
Two opposing positions developed, and people for and against amnesties 
offered arguments supporting their points of view. 
The common arguments in favour (besides the increase in revenue and the 
addition of new individuals to the tax rolls cited above) ranged from moral to 
economical reasons. Amnesties would reduce government administrative costs as 
they would free resources that otherwise would be spent in investigating past years’ 
evasion and would allow them to be used to increase today’s enforcement3. They 
also allow evaders to reduce their guilt, turn over a new leaf and start a new life of 
compliance. This increase in future compliance level may even lead the 
government to lower statutory tax rates4. In addition, the new taxpayers added to 
the records may provide valuable information to improve enforcement and make it 
cheaper, as the government could analyse their characteristics and find common 
patterns amongst evaders and take advantage of them. Another argument says that 
amnesties are good instruments to be used in the transition to a system with more 
severe penalties and that the results are better than if the enhanced enforcement is 
implemented alone 5 . Finally, more elaborate theories support the idea that 
amnesties can generate opportunities for intertemporal consumption-smoothing and 
improved insurance for citizens6. 
However, other people challenged these alleged benefits of amnesties. One of 
the main points of discussion is the addition of new individuals to the tax agency’s 
records. People against amnesties claimed that, in truth, they do not add the 
hardcore evaders but only people who, sooner or later, would have been caught 
anyway. This is especially true, they continued, when they allow people under 
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investigation to participate in them, and so the government is overestimating the 
revenue raised 7 . It was also maintained that people probably decide not to 
participate in the amnesties because (part of) the taxes they evaded are not covered 
by them, and so the effect on the number of new people added to the rolls is 
lessened. The assumption that amnesties increase future compliance was also 
questioned: the granting of an amnesty creates the perception that additional ones 
may be offered sooner or later (even if it is said that it will not be repeated), and so 
people will decide to pay less taxes in anticipation that this evasion will be forgiven 
at some point in the future. Another reason for a decline in voluntary compliance is 
rooted in the possibility that honest taxpayers feel the system is unfair, as it 
rewards non-compliance instead of fighting and punishing it. This can also reduce 
the sense that tax evasion is wrong among people: as “cheaters” are not punished, 
people can think that cheating is the norm, and change their behaviour accordingly. 
But even if this subjective change of opinion does not take place, the mere 
announcement of the amnesty may make taxpayers aware of the extent of 
undetected tax evasion and the low level of efficiency of the tax agency, which 
could lead people to revise downwards their estimates of the probability of 
detection. In the margin, some people who were paying tax will stop doing so, 
again affecting the compliance.  
As usual, there is merit to the arguments on both sides of this question. 
However, the potential risks may outweigh the potential benefits as even a small 
decrease in compliance by the majority who currently pay their full tax liability 
could be more than offset by the short-term, one-time gains from collecting past 
unpaid tax liabilities. 
On the other hand, there is an almost total coincidence about one point: if 
people anticipate the amnesties or if they are used repeatedly, their effect is 
necessarily a decline in long-term compliance8. This is the main hypothesis that the 
present essay intends to test. 
Characterization 
Before moving to the judgment of tax amnesties, it is necessary to analyse their 
basic ingredients. The importance of this activity stems from the fact that different 
types of amnesties imply different effects on equity and efficiency, the two 
standard attributes used to evaluate them. 
The components that define an amnesty are the following: 
 Eligibility: Which individuals are eligible for participation in the amnesty? 
This is an important topic in terms of revenue and long-term compliance. If people 
who are known to be tax delinquents by the tax administration are allowed to 
participate, amnesty revenue is overstated as their amnesty payments would have 
been collected anyway.9 The long-term effect stems from the fact that forgiving 
evaders already known as delinquents may suggest that the tax authority does not 
consider tax evasion a serious offence, and so people are likely to reduce their 
compliance. 
 Coverage: Which taxes are included in the amnesty? In general, taxes 
included fall into the category of those based on the submission of returns to the 
tax authority (income tax, sales tax, etc.), as they are easier to be evaded. 
 Incentives: What incentives and facilities are provided by the tax 
authorities to people who participate in the amnesty? These may include the 
amount/percentage of unpaid taxes, interest and/or penalties that the tax 
administration will forgo, the possibility of paying in instalments, etc. Another 
important incentive is the promise by the government to abstain from following 
certain actions that would be undertaken if the amnesty was not in place. 
According to this criterion, Franzoni (1996) classifies tax amnesties as follows: 
1. Return amnesties: The possibility offered to evaders to revise their tax 
returns with a reduced penalty. Individuals accepting the amnesty are not immune 
from the investigation and auditing activities of the tax administration. 
2. Investigation amnesties: The possibility offered to evaders to get 
exemption from audits on payment of an amnesty fee. This is essentially an offer 
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not to investigate the real amount or the origin or the taxable income of the 
taxpayers who take part in the programme. 
3. Prosecution amnesties: The possibility offered to caught evaders to 
obtain a partial waiving of the penalty if they plea guilty (which eases the judicial 
course of action). In this case, only the prosecution power of the tax administration 
is suspended. 
 Duration: What is the length of the grace period? In general, it is 
predetermined and announced as a one-time benefit. However, some countries 
(including the US, Canada, Germany and Sweden, amongst others) have or have 
had permanent amnesties (e.g., Alm, 1998). 
 Anticipation by individuals: Do people anticipate the granting of the 
amnesty? In general, literature considers unexpected amnesties superior to 
anticipated ones (Andreoni, 1991 is one exception). 
Thus, we can determine and evaluate the effect of an amnesty based on these 
criteria. This evaluation is the subject of the next section. 
 
3. Evaluation of tax amnesties 
Determining the desirability of a tax amnesty implies deciding which attributes 
will be used to measure their benefits and costs. Among them, two are generally 
chosen: equity and efficiency. 
The first one relates to the relative situation of taxpayers and evaders: how does 
an amnesty affect them? It is generally believed that they are advantageous for 
evaders, but this is not necessarily the case. If the evader does not participate in it, 
no benefit accrues to him/her. Even more, some costs may be borne if enforcement 
is tightened after the amnesty, thus leading to a decrease in his/her expected 
utility10 . With respect to the honest taxpayers, the common view is that their 
situation under a tax amnesty vis-a-vis one without it is –at best– unchanged or –
more usually– worse. The main rationale for this stems from the idea that they feel 
the tax system is unfair. However, it is said, if the amnesty is accompanied by an 
improvement in the level of enforcement and a publicity campaign that leads to a 
rise in compliance, this could lead to a higher revenue and, possibly, to a lower rate 
of statutory taxes that would increase taxpayers’ utility. Nonetheless, it is hard to 
determine the net effect of the amnesty in this case, and in any case this reduction 
of the tax rate is not granted automatically if the tax revenue goes up11. 
The second attribute that can be used to evaluate a tax amnesty is its efficiency: 
if one extra pound is spent on the amnesty programme, will it yield more benefits 
than if spent in the best alternative application? In other words, are the resources 
used in the most profitable way as basic microeconomic principles demand? This 
question is actually very difficult to answer, as it will usually rely on assumptions 
about the marginal effect of alternative actions, and these are generally only rough 
guesses. The general approach to resolving this issue consists in assuming that the 
benefits of an amnesty are summarized in the behaviour of the “net tax revenue” 
that it yields.12 This is simply the “gross liabilities” from amnesty returns minus the 
following items: 
 Taxes that have been collected previously, mainly through withholding13. 
 Amounts known to tax authorities that could be collected without an 
amnesty (including those attributable to tax collection cases where receipt of tax 
revenue is only accelerated by the amnesty, to cases which would have been 
identified through routine audits). 
  Penalties forgiven on amounts that would otherwise have been collected. 
 Actual costs of publicizing and administering the amnesty. 
 Opportunity costs of transferring enforcement personnel from their usual 
work to the amnesty.”14 
Both criteria are hard to implement in practice. Consequently, and before 
embarking on the analysis of the empirical case, a review of how the related 
literature has handled this problem will be undertaken in the next section. 
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4. Related literature 
In general, the literature focuses on one-time amnesties and follows the standard 
approach firstly developed by Allingham and Sandmo15. However, the study of 
repeated amnesties is undertaken by some papers. Some are purely theoretical, 
others purely empirical, and others mix both approaches. 
Alm, McKee & Beck (1990) run an experiment and find that an amnesty per se 
lowers compliance, but if it is accompanied by an enhancement of the level of 
enforcement, compliance increases more than if enforcement alone is increased and 
no amnesty was granted. They conclude that the government promise that an 
amnesty will not be repeated is not credible and therefore the expectation of a 
future amnesty reduces compliance. However, experimental groups were composed 
of only 5 people, and maybe that is why they get that an individual’s compliance 
decision depends upon the actions of the other players.16 
 Alm & Beck (1990) point out that, as people choose jointly the amount of past 
evasion to report in the amnesty and the amount of current income to declare to the 
authorities, total revenue increases but its composition is unclear: if the amount of 
past evasion increases, the income declared decreases, and vice versa17. They also 
find that an individual who considers evasion as the norm is unlikely to participate 
in an amnesty, while an individual whose norm is to pay taxes is more prone to 
report any unpaid taxes from previous years in-full. Thus, a good publicity 
campaign that emphasizes that failure to pay taxes is a serious crime can change 
some people’s reference point and so increase compliance, something that could 
not be explained using expected utility theory. 
Andreoni (1991) focuses on permanent amnesties, assuming that people are 
motivated to accept the amnesty because shocks to their consumption make them 
unwilling to bear the risk of an audit. He proves that a permanent amnesty can 
improve (or at least maintain) the efficiency of the system, as it acts like a partial 
social insurance, and that it can also enhance the equity, as it reduces the loss of the 
people who suffered a negative shock.  Strikingly, this can happen even when 
revenue declines.18 He claims that although cheating will rise as a result of the 
amnesty, revenue will not necessarily fall; moreover, cheating will only rise to the 
extent that people expect to participate in the amnesty, and if they do participate 
government will recapture not only the new cheating but the pre-existing ones as 
well. 
Malik & Schwab (1991) assume that people are uncertain about the 
utility/disutility from tax evasion, and so an amnesty (granted once the uncertainty 
is solved, but after the people filed their tax returns) is an opportunity to revise 
their original choice19. According to the paper, people take advantage of amnesties 
because they realize –after the uncertainty is solved– that the costs of cheating 
outweighs its benefits.  
Stella (1991) bases his model on the fact that the government can only enforce 
the tax laws by increasing the audit probability, but this is costly. So, as it is 
difficult for people to monitor the actual enforcement effort of the government, the 
government could be tempted to lower its audit rate and reduce cost without 
announcing it. Knowing these motivations are present, tax evaders will be sceptical 
about government claims that tax enforcement will be increased and therefore will 
not participate in the amnesty. Consequently, revenue will increase only if the 
government is credible20. But a “weak” government (i.e., one which enforcement 
costs are high) has incentives to pretend it is strong and is determined to effectively 
increase the enforcement. So people will be uncertain about the type of government 
even if the audit rate rises, simply because the government could be just pretending 
to be a strong one in order to gain from increased compliance and participation in 
the amnesty. Under these circumstances, the effects of granting an amnesty will be 
rather poor, even when enforcement is increased. Standing amnesties deliver even 
worse results, since they lessen the risk of tax evasion and reduce the revenue the 
government could get from actually increasing enforcement.  
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Alm & Beck (1991) test the effects of tax amnesties using data from 1980ies’s 
amnesties in US states. They find that greater enforcement increases the income 
reported in the amnesty, but stress the fact that the revenue impact is relatively 
small. 
Pommerehne & Zweifel (1991) construct a political economy model where 
people must vote in favour or against the granting of a tax amnesty and then decide 
whether or not to participate. They find that the amnesty increases compliance, 
insinuating that the success of the amnesties depends heavily on public support. 
Alm & Beck (1993) empirically investigate the effects of the 1985 Colorado 
amnesty. Their main result is that it had virtually no long run impact on either the 
level or the trend of tax collection. They also presume that if the amnesty had not 
been followed by stiffer penalties, then post-amnesty revenue may well have fallen. 
Consequently, they conclude that a typical amnesty seems unlikely to generate 
large one-time revenues but (opposite to theoretical predictions) it also seems 
unlikely to have significant negative effects on long run compliance. 
Graetz & Wilde (1993) focus on “strategic non-filers” (i.e., evaders whose tax 
due is large and the cost of filing a return is low, so they are fully aware that they 
are breaking the law). They find that more enforcement leads to more non-filers 
participation in the amnesty and that the expected revenue falls when an amnesty is 
offered21. 
Franzoni (1995) models a world where the authority is uncertain about the 
innocence of a person, finding it out is costly, and the authority can offer a 
settlement to people who declare themselves guilty. 22 A tax amnesty is then a 
settlement offer open to everyone who fulfils the tax agency requirements. The 
problem is one of time consistency: ex-ante, the penalties are selected by the 
parliament to minimize the social loss resultant from the offence (goal: deterrence); 
but ex-post the enforcer (tax agency) focuses on the cost of the investigation 
process (goal: efficiency). The settlement allows decreasing these costs (increasing 
welfare), but it also decreases the deterrence power of the enforcement policy 
(decreasing welfare), so the net effect is ambiguous. 
Cassone & Marchese (1995) find that amnesties are profitable as long as 
taxpayers have heterogeneous demands for insurance against penalties and that 
they can induce self-selection of taxpayers23. They focus on perfectly anticipated 
periodic amnesties and compare them with “the sales of fashion wear held at the 
end of the season, when the residual period is short”. A government that provides 
this type of amnesty, they say, engages in mixed bundling, where the insurance can 
be bought as part of the bundle (tax) or on a unit basis (amnesty), but only at a 
given time and if certain conditions are met. However, they say, if less visible 
people correctly anticipate this effect they may prefer not to participate in the 
amnesty. The solution they propose is that the government should credibly commit 
itself in advance not to use the information gathered in the amnesty. But it is 
difficult for a government to commit to it: that information is perhaps the most 
valuable gain from an amnesty as it is likely to provide pointers on where and how 
to catch hard-core evaders. 
Franzoni (1996) focuses on permanent investigation amnesties, in which the tax 
agency offers the option to taxpayers of paying a fixed amount or filing a return, 
and finds that they increase the tax administration’s net revenue. This stems from 
two facts: the administration extracts the risk premium from amnesty participants 
(as they get insurance against audits) and collects resources from taxpayers on the 
basis of a pure (costless) threat. Amnesties, he argues, induce taxpayers with the 
highest willingness to pay to self-select and to elude the standard 
enforcement/prosecution procedure (which is expensive to the administration). 
Engel & Hines (1998) model an economy where the government audits people’s 
current year’s returns and, if evasion is discovered, it also investigates earlier 
years’ returns. So, people decide how much to evade today and how much 
tomorrow. Consequently, if a person participates in the amnesty, he/she will evade 
next period as he/she would pay only the fines on current year evasion if caught. 
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Aggregate tax revenue is therefore likely to fall in years after amnesties, though tax 
collections in the long run are unaffected. 
Franzoni (2000) argues, in line with his 1995 paper, that amnesties allow the tax 
agency to overcome its limited control over the enforcement parameters, and 
therefore to increase net revenue 24 . He proves that amnesties are superior to 
individual deals (as they allow the agency to reduce an excessive tax differential) 
and that it is part of an optimal strategy for the tax agency. In the model the agency 
acts as a monopolist which provides insurance against audits via the amnesty and it 
is assumed that everyone (evader or not) is interested in getting it since audits 
impose a defence cost on people inspected that is not refunded by the state nor can 
be covered by private insurance. Nonetheless, he recognizes that in a first-best 
world in which all enforcement parameters are optimally chosen, amnesties and 
settlements cannot increase tax revenue, and they can only represent second-best 
instruments that can be used when major reforms of the tax system are not 
practicable. 
Marceau & Mongrain (2000) develop a model in which an exogenous shock 
affects the parameters of the problem after the individual has decided whether to 
evade or not but before he/she decides whether to participate or not in the amnesty 
in the case it is granted25. One of the striking conclusions they reach is that under 
certain conditions (a large number of very cooperative participants, so a large 
proportion of the social cost is recovered) fully anticipated amnesties can be 
efficient and, furthermore, the optimal level of enforcement can be lower than in 
the no-amnesty scenario (as there are fewer criminals and they are cooperative). 
Evaluation of the literature 
The first point to note is that most of the papers reviewed develop models based 
on the expected utility theory (Alm & Beck, 1990’s model based on prospect 
theory is an exception). However, “given the percentage of tax returns that are 
audited and the penalties imposed on audited tax returns, taxpayers would have to 
exhibit risk aversion far in excess of anything observed for compliance predicted 
by expected utility theory to approximate actual compliance” (Skinner & Slemrod, 
1985). Furthermore, some of them also assume risk-neutrality (Pommerehne & 
Zweifel, 1991, Graetz & Wilde, 1993), mainly for simplicity. In practice, most 
individuals are risk averse, and the degree of risk aversion is crucial to determine 
the level of compliance of a person: the greater the absolute risk aversion, the 
greater the amount of income that will be declared to the tax agency.26,27 
Another feature to take into account is that many models are perfect-
information ones (assume people and the government know every –or almost 
every– parameter), which is hard to believe: yet they assume, for example, that 
people know the true probability of being audited (Stella, 1991 is one of the 
exceptions), their future income (Andreoni, 1991) or even their utility functions 
(Malik & Schwab, 1991). It is also implausible that the government knows, for 
instance, the utility functions of the taxpayers or their risk aversion. 
Also, many papers overlook the heterogeneity of the individuals and assume 
instead a representative individual.28 Finally, the empirical results are far from 
definitive: some studies support amnesties (Pommerehne & Zweifel, 1991, etc.), 
others reject them (Alm & Beck, 1991, etc.), and others consider them innocuous 
(Alm & Beck, 1993, etc.). In the next section we consider an empirical case that 
will help us to shed some light on this discussion. 
 
5. Model and results 
Despite the weaknesses in the literature identified in the previous section, a 
traditional approach will be taken to model the effects of a tax amnesty. The main 
reason for this is data-driven: only aggregate data are available, and so we cannot 
take heterogeneity into account. The issue of uncertainty is solved by assuming that 
people and government learn as time goes by.29 
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The standard tax evasion model (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972) relies on the 
assumption that people maximize their expected utility (EU) by choosing the 
optimal amount of income to be declared to the tax authority: 
 
)()()1( ZUqYUqEU    (1) 
 
where Y=W-tX (i.e., disposable income if not audited) and Z=W-tX-p(W-X) 
(disposable income if audited30), W is true income, X is reported income, t is the 
tax rate, q is the audit probability, p (which must be greater than t) is the penalty 
rate and U( ) is the utility function such that U’( )>0 and U”( )<031. Thus, evasion is 
simply another “risky investment”, and the expected disposable income of this 
gamble is 
 
XqptWqpWE D  )()1()(  (2) 
 
and the expected rate of return is 
 
qpte    (3) 
 
per dollar evaded. 
The interpretation of (3) is straightforward: as an extra pound is evaded, two 
opposite effects materialize: 
1. Expected benefits rise (first term in (3)): the extra pound evaded does not 
pay a fraction t of taxes anymore. 
2. Expected costs also rise (second term in (3)): the extra pound evaded 
should pay a fraction p as a penalty; however, this effect is moderated by the fact 
that there is only a probability q of being audited and caught. 
Individuals then solve the maximization problem and choose the optimal level 
of evasion E*=W-X*, that satisfies the first order condition:  
 
qtp
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YU
ZU



)(
)1(
)('
)('
*
*
 (4) 
 
It is important to note that a person will declare all his/her income if and only if 
 
pqt    (5) 
 
and will evade only if 
 
pqt  32  (6) 
 
Note that, as expected, if a person declares all his/her income (i.e., the condition 
stated in equation (5) is satisfied), then there is no uncertainty: the individual’s 
disposable income is WtW D  )1( . According to this and taking into account 
that evasion does exist in the real world, it will be assumed from here on that the 
condition in equation (6) is satisfied. 
The comparative statics analysis reveals that improving enforcement, i.e., 
increasing the probability of an audit (q) or the penalty rate (p), decreases the 
evasion level (X). Nonetheless, the effect of a change in income is ambiguous, as is 
the effect of a change in the tax rate. The rationale for the first case is that a higher 
income implies a higher disposable income if the individual is not caught evading, 
but a higher fine if s/he is caught, and so the net effect depends on which one of 
these forces prevails. Similarly, an increase in the tax rate has two opposite effects: 
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it makes evasion more profitable in the margin, and so evasion will rise, but also 
reduces disposable income, and so evasion will decrease.33,34 
Summarizing, the optimal amount of reported income will be a function of the 
parameters of the model: 
 
 ),,,(
(?))()((?)
* WpqtfX

  (7) 
 
However –and even when they are closely related– the main interest is not in 
the optimal level of reported income, but the expected total tax revenue, which is 
given by: 
 
)],,,([),,,( WpqtXWpqWpqtXtR   (8) 
 
where the first term is the revenue raised from voluntary payments and the 
second one is the revenue expected to be raised from penalties. Totally 
differentiating this expression we find that: 
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It is worth noting that each one of these derivatives can be positive, negative or 
zero, as long as there is evasion (i.e., 0 pqt ). Therefore, the theory alone 
cannot help us to determine the impact of changes in the parameters on net 
revenues and we need to carry out an empirical analysis to pin them down. 
Notice that we can introduce an amnesty in the model by assuming that, during 
the time the amnesty is granted, the penalty rate )( p  is reduced. Consequently, the 
theory will suggest that a tax amnesty will decrease the amount reported to the tax 
authority (i.e., evasion will increase), but the effect on the revenue will be 
uncertain. The reason for this is that a reduction in the penalty rate makes evasion 
less costly, and so people will evade more. On the other side, the effect on the 
expected revenue is ambiguous as the first term in (11) –the direct effect- is 
positive and the second –the indirect effect- is negative. But as the former is 
expected to be larger than the latter, we predict the revenue to decrease when an 
amnesty is offered. 
 
6. Empirical analysis 
The next step is, now, the evaluation of the effects of tax amnesties. Now, as 
mentioned before, the two attributes most generally used to evaluate the effects of 
the tax amnesties are equity and efficiency, but equity is difficult to assess (since 
we only have access to aggregate data), and so we will focus on efficiency, that 
will be measured in terms of revenue. Consequently, we constructed an “expected 
tax revenue” series for the Tucuman province in Argentina for the 1978-1999 
period, and investigated if amnesties affect it. 
The expected tax revenue is defined simply as 
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where t is the tax rate and S is the total amount of sales in a given period35. In 
other words, the expected tax revenue is the revenue collected by the tax agency in 
the no-evasion scenario.36 So, if effective revenue mimics the behaviour of eR , 
then the amnesty does not affect revenue37. 
Other factors to be considered are, as theory suggests, the penalty rate, the tax 
rate and the audit probability. Nonetheless, Tucuman province’s penalty rate was 
roughly fixed in the period (it remained around 25% of the evaded tax), and so it 
does not help to explain the behaviour of the revenue38. The same can be said of the 
tax rate: its value was almost unchanged, being about 2.5% during the entire 
period.  With respect to the audit probability, the information was not disclosed by 
the local tax agency, and so it is missing in the analysis39. Finally, given the lack of 
reliable statistics on the total amount of sales, we use Tucuman province’s GDP as 
a proxy.40 
Therefore, the equation to be estimated is: 
 
),( ttt YAfT    (14) 
 
where T is tax revenue per capita, Y is GDP per capita and A is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 when an amnesty is granted and 0 otherwise. 
Assuming a linear functional form, the expected signs are: 
 
0


Y
T
  (15) 
 
(i.e., the higher the income, the higher the revenue -as the tax rate does not 
change-), and 
 
0




A
T
  (16) 
 
(i.e., the effect of an amnesty on the revenue is undetermined). It is precisely the 
theoretical discussion about the sign of this derivative why we undertake this 
analysis, and determining it is therefore its main goal.41 The results of the analysis 
(in error correction form) are set out in the next table42: 
 
Table 1. Impact of amnesties on tax revenue 
  Dependent Variable: DT 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
DA(-2) 0.4525 2.3418 
T(-1) -0.5460 -6.3879 
DT(-1) -0.3212 -4.2939 
DT(-2) -0.2256 -4.0477 
DT(-5) -0.1544 -3.8357 
DT(-12) 0.1244 3.3754 
Y(-1) 3956.2780 5.0005 
DY(-1) 14503.2900 3.2169 
DY(-4) -26250.2500 -3.6140 
DY(-5) 16197.8000 2.3393 
DY(-12) -16249.0800 -3.6876 
  R-squared 0.6108 
  Adj. R-squared 0.5941 
 
It is immediately recognizable that amnesties do not affect long run revenue, but 
they do have a short run effect. Reorganizing, the equation can be rewritten as 
follows: 
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So, an amnesty raises revenue by $ 0.4525 millions (roughly 6% of the average 
revenue) two months after it starts, but this revenue is lost against the following 
month43. 
In the long run, tTTandAAYY LRt
LR
t
LR
t  , , and so every 
difference vanishes. Then the long run equation reduces to 
 
LRLR YT  278.3956546.00  (18) 
 
or 
 
LRLR YT  2802.7245  (19) 
 
and it is clear that the amnesty does not affect the long run revenue44. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The goal of this essay is to determine the effects of repeated tax amnesties on 
the economy. 
To achieve it, a model was developed and its predictions were tested against the 
data from Tucuman (Argentina). The fundamental conjecture of the model affirms 
that amnesties lower the revenue, as they reduce the penalties and make evasion 
more profitable. In spite of that prediction, the analysis yields the opposite: tax 
amnesties do not affect the long-term revenue.  
The other main result of the study is in line with what the theory suggests: the 
increase in short-run revenue is temporary and only accelerates the collection of the 
taxes but does not increase the amount collected. These two results coincide with 
the ones in Alm & Beck (1993). 
As an institutional remark related to tax amnesties, it is worth citing the 
comment of Franzoni (1995) on the relationship between the underlying situation 
and the application of tax amnesties as a source of revenue: “It is no surprise that 
amnesties are abundantly used in countries in which the enforcement systems 
suffer from major structural problems. In these contexts, amnesties can be viewed 
not only as an indication of an inability of the enforcer to commit, but also as 
attempts to overcome the structural rigidity which gives rise to problems. The 
problem is, however, that the unlimited use of these second best tools allows the 
state to capitalize on its own inefficiency and provides an excuse to indefinitely 
delay any thorough-going reform of the enforcement system.” 
In short, despite the possible short-run benefits and apparent innocuousness in 
the long-run they generate, tax amnesties are only second-best tools and should 
only be used when deep reforms in the tax system cannot be undertaken. The 
results in this essay support this view, as the frequent amnesties issued in the 
period considered increased revenue only temporarily but did not affected the long-
run levels, and so they were just used to avoid a tax reform that is getting more and 
more urgent as time goes by. 
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 Notes 
 
1 Andreoni (1991), who studies the case of permanent amnesties, is one of the exceptions. 
2 A common constraint on the penalties is that they cannot exceed the taxpayer’s residual wealth. 
3 This is particularly true since the probability of detecting a tax evader typically decreases over time. 
Hence, amnesties would avoid wasting time and money in hopeless investigations. 
4 With respect to the guilt issue, the argument says that former delinquents may wish to correct their 
previous illegal actions but are afraid of the prosecution and penalties that normally accompany the 
discovery of tax evasion. Since penalties are reduced under the amnesty, that fear disappears and 
they agree to participate in the amnesty. The most appealing way to understand why a person who 
originally decides to evade taxes then considers participating in an amnesty is by assuming that 
some kind of uncertainty is present when the first decision is taken, is solved before the second, and 
the new information changes the circumstances in such a way that the new optimal strategy is to 
participate in the amnesty. This approach is followed by some authors (Andreoni, 1991, Marceau & 
Mongrain, 2000, Malik & Schwab, 1991). Precisely Malik & Schwab (1991) develop a model in 
which guilt can be understood in an economic environment because people are uncertain about their 
utility functions. Another model that can capture the idea of guilt is the one of Alm & Beck (1990), 
based on prospect theory. It allows people to change their opinions as a result of a change in their 
reference points (by the effect of, for example, the publicity accompanying the amnesty). Thus, 
guilt can be generated when a person who formerly considered evasion the norm begins to consider 
paying taxes as the norm. 
5 See for example Alm, McKee & Beck (1990) 
6 See for example Franzoni (1998) and Andreoni (1991). 
7 Using an opportunity cost approach, as long as these people would have been caught anyway the 
government should not consider the tax collected from them as a gain of the amnesty. In this case, 
the amnesty only acts as a catalyst that accelerates the revenue collection. And even when this 
effect could be beneficial when considering it in terms of intertemporal substitution, it must also be 
pointed out that, by granting the amnesty, the government renounces its entitlement to the penalties 
that would have been charged otherwise against these people. Related to the intertemporal issue, 
another point raised against amnesties (but only against those that eliminate the penalties as well as 
the interest) stems from the fact that, if interest on unpaid taxes is forgiven, an amnesty participant 
will pay lower taxes (when adjusted for the time value of money) than taxpayers who paid their 
taxes when due. 
8 Andreoni (1991) is one exception. 
9 Moreover, the government misses the corresponding penalties. 
10 Of course, this decrease was not enough to move him/her to take part in the amnesty. 
11 The decision on whether or not to lower the tax rate is a political one, and therefore there is no 
certainty that the rate will be cut. Moreover, many amnesties are used as a way to obtain quick 
revenue increases to close the deficit gap. In this situation, a decrease in the rate is rather unlikely to 
happen. 
12 Andreoni (1991) and other authors who use shock-models include risk-sharing as another element 
that can be used to measure the efficiency of a tax amnesty. 
13 If an amnesty return is an amendment of a previously filed return, previously admitted liability must 
be subtracted. 
14 Lerman (1986) 
15 Allingham & Sandmo (1972). 
16 There is a literature that supports the interaction between members of the society when deciding 
whether to evade or not: stigma and social conformity models are examples of it. What it is pointed 
out here is that, by taking a small group of people in the experiment, this effect can be 
overestimated. 
17 It is worth noting that this is true as long as the tax agency does not check the evasion declared, as 
when an investigation amnesty is granted. The authors failed to mention it despite the fact that it is 
implicitly assumed. 
18 Interestingly, when considering the equity issue, he says that “an argument may be made that 
amnesty favours those with lower ethical standards. This is especially true if amnesty requires 
raising taxes, which means that the honest people may have to pay part of the insurance benefits 
granted to dishonest people. However, if the amnesty increases tax revenues, then only the 
dishonest people will see their tax payments raise. In this case, the honest people may benefit the 
most since they will share in the tax cut that the amnesty makes possible. Therefore, even if only 
dishonest people get the direct benefit of the amnesty, it may still treat the honest taxpayers 
equitably”. Nonetheless, he also points out an important comment of a referee: “If cheaters are 
given lower welfare weight in a social welfare function than honest taxpayers, then amnesty may 
reduce welfare (even if revenues rise and each individual’s utility rises) simply by converting 
sufficient numbers of honest people to cheaters”. 
19 One way to characterize honest and dishonest people (according to the authors) is by their absolute 
risk aversion: greater absolute risk aversion implies more income will be reported. So, according to 
this interpretation, “honesty” is the result of a level of risk aversion high enough to dissuade the 
person from evasion. 
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20 Government reputation from previous experience in similar situations constitutes an important sign 
that people take into account to determine government credibility. 
21 This last conclusion comes from the assumption that individuals are risk neutral. The authors 
highlight the fact that amnesties can increase government revenue only if taxpayers are sufficiently 
risk averse or their discount factors differ substantially from the government’s discount factor. 
22 This settlement offer is made on a take-it-or-leave-it basis (i.e., the accused has no bargaining 
power). 
23 According to the authors, the amnesty is selective because more “visible” individuals are more 
likely to be caught before the amnesty date (and thus are willing to pay immediately) while less 
visible ones are more likely to accept the amnesty. 
24 The enforcement parameters considered are the tax rate and the penalty levels, which are set by the 
parliament and cannot be modified by the tax agency. 
25 This shock-approach is the same followed by Andreoni (1991) and Malik & Schwab (1991). The 
importance of introducing it stems from the fact that if an individual was willing to commit a crime 
when the sanction was large, then this individual will certainly want to remain a criminal when an 
amnesty is offered and the sanction is reduced (i.e., the cost of being a criminal is reduced), unless 
something happens on the side of benefits. The shock acts, then, as the factor that reduces the 
benefits of tax evasion and makes some individuals willing to participate in the amnesty. 
26 Malik & Schwab (1991).  
27 Nonetheless, note that the assumption of risk neutrality can be true in the case of firms. 
28 The “shock models” (Marceau & Mongrain, 2000, Andreoni, 1991, and Malik & Schwab, 1991) do 
consider heterogeneous people by allowing certain parameters to change across the population 
(income, risk aversion, etc.). Cassone & Marchese (1995) also allow heterogeneity in their model. 
29 This can be justified because our study is based on the analysis of time series, and because learning 
is very likely to occur as our database includes data from several amnesties.  
30 The standard model also assumes that audits disclose evasion with certainty, i.e. audits are 100% 
effective. This is in fact a strong assumption, since the investigation can be less efficient in reality, 
individuals can spend money in improving the concealing technology (e.g., “creative” accounting) 
and/or bribing inspectors, etc. 
31 Actually, U”( ) could also be equal to zero when firms are considered. This is especially relevant 
here since data used in the study case comes from sales taxes paid by firms. 
32 The remaining case (t < p*q ) is omitted since individuals will declare all their incomes. However, 
as audits are costly, the government would never choose q such that t <p*q since it can get the same 
result (no evasion) with a lower expenditure by setting t = p*q. 
33 Under Arrow’s Hypothesis that absolute risk aversion increases as income decreases. 
34 See appendix for the computation of the first order conditions. 
35 In spite of having developed a model where people decide how much income to declare, the 
empirical analysis will be based on data from sales taxes. However, the model can be easily 
transformed into one in which firms decide how much sales to declare by substituting sales for 
income in every equation.  
36 As evasion is assumed to exist, the expected net revenue will always be greater than the effective 
tax revenue. However, the important factor is not the actual gap between them, but if they move 
together or not. If they do, it can be deduced that the cause of the joint movement is the same for 
both series. If they do not, an exogenous shock (as the grant of a tax amnesty) is probably the 
reason of the divergence. 
37 This is true irrespective of the actual behaviour of the effective revenue: even if it rises (what 
someone could interpret as an effect of a successful amnesty), if it is only reproducing the path 
followed by the expected tax revenue the logical conclusion is that amnesties are not affecting it and 
that its movements are the result of changes in other variables. 
38 Even more important, this reveals that no effort to increase enforcement was made through this 
channel. 
39 In any case, it is thought that one of the reasons to deny the information is precisely the poor 
performance of the audits in terms of revenue. It must be stressed, however, that although the audit 
probability is important for our analysis, it might be even more relevant to know how effective the 
audit are: even with a high audit probability revenue could fall if the inspectors cannot discover the 
evasion (e.g., because firms can hide it successfully and/or inspectors’ skills are low) or if 
corruption keeps it undisclosed (i.e., inspectors discover it, but they accept bribes from evaders to 
conceal it). 
40 Two other factors were considered, even if they were not part of the model: inflation and population 
growth. With respect to the first one, both tax revenue and GDP were expressed in constant prices. 
With respect to the second one, the inspection of the correlation matrix revealed a high correlation 
between both series mentioned above (already adjusted for inflation) and population. To resolve this 
difficulty, the series were transformed into per capita series. For a description and graphic 
representation of the series used, please see sections 2.1. and 2.2. in the appendix. 
41  The stationarity and autocorrelation analysis are shown in sections 2.3., 2.4. and 2.5. in the 
appendix.  
42 References: 
 DT = Tt – Tt-1  DA(-2) = At-2 – At-3 
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 T(-1) = Tt-1   DT(-1) = Tt-1 – Tt-2 
 DT(-2) = Tt-2 – Tt-3 DT(-5) = Tt-5 – Tt-6 
 DT(-12) = Tt-12 – Tt-13 Y(-1) = Yt-1 
 DY(-1) = Yt-1 – Yt-2 DY(-4) = Yt-4 – Yt-5 
 DY(-5) = Yt-5 – Yt-6 DY(-12) = Yt-12 – Yt-13 
43 The rationale for this behaviour comes from the fact that the mean duration of the amnesties during 
the period was 2.29 months and that the bulk of the amnesty revenue was generally raised the last 
days before the deadline. However, the increase in revenue is only temporary as can be noticed 
from the fact that the extra amount raised the last month of the amnesty is exactly the same amount 
“lost” the next period. So, this will support the hypothesis that the amnesty only accelerates the 
collection on taxes but it does not affect revenue in the long run. 
44 Note, however, that the audit probability and its effectiveness could be an important factor in order 
to explain the behaviour of the long run revenue, and so equation (19) is not necessarily the most 
accurate estimate of the long run revenue. It is just the best one given the availability of 
information. 
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Appendix 
1. First order conditions of the optimal evasion problem 
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2. Estimation of the model 
2.1. Data 
 Sales tax revenue. Tucuman province (Argentina). May 1978 - September 1999. In tens of 
pesos (base: 1993=100). Source: Tax Agency – Tucuman, Argentina. 
 GDP. Tucuman province (Argentina). May 1978 - September 1999. In millions of pesos 
(base: 1993=100). Source: University of Tucuman – Tucuman, Argentina. 
 Tax amnesties. Tucuman province (Argentina). May 1978 - September 1999. In tens of 
pesos (base: 1993=100). Source: Tax Agency – Tucuman, Argentina. 
17 amnesties were granted in the period. Everyone included the sales taxes. Except the first four 
ones, all of them were investigation amnesties. 
 Consumer prices index. Tucuman province (Argentina). May 1978 – September 1999. Base 
1994=100. Source: University of Tucuman – Tucuman, Argentina. 
 Population. Tucuman province (Argentina). May 1978 – September 1999. Source: 
University of Tucuman – Tucuman, Argentina. 
 
2.2. Graphics: The (detrended) series are plotted below: 
 
 
2.3. Stationarity 
Both series are stationary, as well as the residuals, what confirms that there is a long run relationship 
between the variables. The unit root tests (no constant and no trend included) are presented below. 
 
Variable: T     
ADF Test Statistic -3.2707     1%   Critical Value* -3.4588 
      5%   Critical Value -2.8735 
      10% Critical Value -2.5731 
Variable: Y     
ADF Test Statistic -4.0609     1%   Critical Value* -3.4588 
      5%   Critical Value -2.8735 
      10% Critical Value -2.5731 
Variable: RESID     
ADF Test Statistic -3.7599     1%   Critical Value* -3.4588 
      5%   Critical Value -2.8735 
      10% Critical Value -2.5731 
2.4. Correlation 
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As the residuals are not correlated with the independent variables, OLS provides consistent estimators 
and the t-tests are valid. (This was confirmed by revising the correlation matrix). 
2.5. Serial correlation 
The Lagrange Multiplier test corroborates that residuals are not serially autocorrelated: 
 
Variable: RESID    
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
Obs*R-squared 19.5717     Probability 0.106417 
 
2.6. Stability of the coefficients 
The CUSUM test shows that the coefficients are stable: 
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